Do labour market institutions matter? Micro-level wage effects of international outsourcing in three European countries by Geishecker, Ingo et al.
www.ssoar.info
Do labour market institutions matter? Micro-level
wage effects of international outsourcing in three
European countries
Geishecker, Ingo; Görg, Holger; Munch, Jakob Roland
Postprint / Postprint
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
www.peerproject.eu
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Geishecker, I., Görg, H., & Munch, J. R. (2010). Do labour market institutions matter? Micro-level wage effects
of international outsourcing in three European countries. Review of World Economics, 146(1), 179-198. https://
doi.org/10.1007/s10290-009-0039-9
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter dem "PEER Licence Agreement zur
Verfügung" gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zum PEER-Projekt finden
Sie hier: http://www.peerproject.eu Gewährt wird ein nicht
exklusives, nicht übertragbares, persönliches und beschränktes
Recht auf Nutzung dieses Dokuments. Dieses Dokument
ist ausschließlich für den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen
Gebrauch bestimmt. Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments
müssen alle Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise
auf gesetzlichen Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses
Dokument nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen
Sie dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under the "PEER Licence
Agreement ". For more Information regarding the PEER-project
see: http://www.peerproject.eu This document is solely intended
for your personal, non-commercial use.All of the copies of
this documents must retain all copyright information and other
information regarding legal protection. You are not allowed to alter
this document in any way, to copy it for public or commercial
purposes, to exhibit the document in public, to perform, distribute
or otherwise use the document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
Diese Version ist zitierbar unter / This version is citable under:
https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-212491
ORI GIN AL PA PER
Do labour market institutions matter? Micro-level wage
effects of international outsourcing in three European
countries
Ingo Geishecker • Holger Go¨rg •
Jakob Roland Munch
Published online: 19 January 2010
 The Author(s) 2010. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract This paper studies the impact of outsourcing on individual wages in
three European countries with markedly different labour market institutions:
Germany, the UK and Denmark. To do so we use individual-level data sets for the
three countries and construct comparable measures of outsourcing at the industry
level, distinguishing outsourcing by broad region. We discuss some possible intu-
itive reasons for why there may be differences in the impact of outsourcing across
the three countries, based on labour market institutions.
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JEL Classification F16  J31  C23
1 Introduction
Over the last years globalisation and its alleged negative effects for the distribution
of income, unemployment, poverty and social cohesion has caused immense public
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anxiety in Europe, particularly against the backdrop of eastern enlargement of the
European Union. Indeed, globalisation in the form of intensified international trade
and, in particular, international outsourcing of production, has a deep structural
impact fostering the specialisation of open economies in industries where they
possess a comparative advantage. Other, less competitive industries on the other
hand shrink. Following standard trade theory, international specialisation is
expected to yield significant efficiency gains improving the welfare of open
economies.1
However, even if there are overall welfare gains there will inevitably be
distributional consequences leading to winners and losers of the globalisation
process in the economy. This paper concerns itself with one aspect of globalisation,
namely the practice of outsourcing of production around the globe. A key feature
of today’s globalisation process is the ever increasing international fragmentation of
production resulting in outsourcing, that manifests itself in a fast growing share of
trade with intermediate goods. What we witness now is a dramatically intensified
international division of labour which does not only take place between industries
but is prevalent within each manufacturing industry and increasingly within
business services.
Trade liberalisation and technological progress have substantially lowered
transaction costs which increasingly enables firms to outsource and relocate
production to those locations where production costs are lowest. Analogue to
conventional trade this outsourcing potentially yields large efficiency gains that
materialise in the form of increased competitiveness and thus higher growth and
employment.2 However, it is also clear that this process generates winners and
losers. Particularly low-skilled workers in industrialised countries are arguably at
risk to suffer higher economic insecurity, income losses, unemployment and social
exclusion.
The aim of the paper is, hence, to try and identify winners and losers from
international outsourcing in European economies. Specifically, we investigate the
impact of outsourcing on wages of individual workers. A further aim of the paper is
to establish whether the impact of international outsourcing differs across countries
with different types of welfare states and, in particular, labour market institutions.
In other words, we try to address the question as to what role labour market
institutions may play in shaping the wage effect of international outsourcing on
workers.
This makes our paper of particular relevance in the European context and
highlights the importance of institutional characteristics of the labour market that
affect the wage setting. Welfare states face the challenge of mitigating adverse
effects of the globalisation process while at the same time the institutional
characteristics of the welfare system directly shape the potential welfare gains and
1 Slightly newer trade models, however, have shown that the paradigm of universal welfare gains through
international trade is heavily based on the assumptions of perfect competition and flexible factor prices.
For example, Krugman (1995) shows that with rigid relative factor prices imports from low-wage
countries cannot be met by a sufficient specialisation in export oriented activities. As a result, trade with
low-wage countries can dramatically lower aggregate domestic production and employment.
2 See, e.g., Amiti and Wei (2009) and Go¨rg et al. (2008).
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losses from international outsourcing. In the public but also academic debate one
often refers to the European Social Model or the European Welfare System partly to
contrast the American Social Model. However, institutional characteristics of the
welfare system starkly differ within Europe. Somewhat simplifying, one can
identify three types of social models within the European Union: the Anglo-Saxon,
the Central European and the Scandinavian. All three substantially differ in terms of
institutions and legislation particularly with respect to employment protection,
unemployment benefits, minimum wages or the role of unions. The literature lacks
detailed theories on how labour market institutions affect the impact of outsourcing
on wages, so it is an open question that will be addressed empirically in this paper
which social model is best suited to cope with the challenges of globalisation
through outsourcing of production.
Empirical evidence so far suggests that low-skilled workers are the losers from
international outsourcing of production in many countries.3 However, the existing
empirical studies generally use fairly aggregated data which prevents an in-depth
analysis of the social impact of this phenomenon. Namely, existing studies do not
allow to separate changes in the composite demand for various skill groups in wage
and employment effects. Furthermore, using aggregated data does not allow
differentiating absolute gains and losses from relative ones. However, when designing
policies it clearly matters whether the task is for instance to tackle increased income
inequality that comes through absolute wage gains for highly educated workers or
through absolute wage losses of low-skilled workers.
This paper provides a detailed disaggregated estimation of the impact of
international outsourcing on individual wages for various population groups. We
will identify winners and losers from the globalisation process and assess to what
extent education and, thus, skills determine the individually experienced impact of
globalisation. Although wages at the aggregate level are central determinants of
social cohesion our micro level approach allows us to also look at other important
factors. It is now not only possible to look at aggregated wage effects but also to
assess the role of globalisation for individual economic security that manifests itself
in annual income fluctuations.
The analysis is carried out for three countries: the United Kingdom, Germany and
Denmark, that exemplary stand for the three different social models in Europe and
significantly differ in terms of the institutional setting. Comparing the social impact
of relocation across these three countries can provide interesting new insights into
the role of institutions and social policies for shaping and mitigating the impact of
globalisation.
Section 2 discusses briefly the theoretical background and the expected impact of
labour market institutions on the relationship between international outsourcing and
wages. Section 3 describes the empirical approach, measurement of outsourcing and
micro data for the three countries. Estimation results are reported in Sect. 4. The
final section offers a brief conclusion.
3 See for example Feenstra and Hanson (1996) on the US, Hijzen et al. (2005) on the UK and Geishecker
(2006) on Germany.
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2 International outsourcing, labour market institutions and wages
In theory the consequences of outsourcing for workers of different skill types are not
clear cut. For example, Feenstra and Hanson (1996) formulate a model of
international outsourcing that is a specific form of a Heckscher–Ohlin (HO) type
model with only one final good and two countries, North and South. By changing
relative unit costs of production, for instance through Hicks-neutral technological
progress in the South, production fragments with lower skill intensity are shifted
from the North to the South, thereby raising the average skill intensity of production
in both countries. As a result, relative demand for skilled labour increases in both
the North and the South. By contrast, Arndt (1997, 1999) develops a model of
international outsourcing that is also based on a HO framework but makes less
restrictive assumptions. In particular, he considers trade between a small price-
taking economy and the rest of the world, allowing for two factors of production and
two final goods. In this model, if the low-skill intensive industry shifts some
fragments of production abroad, this results in a productivity improvement in the
low-skill intensive industry and with given world prices, ultimately in higher
relative wages for unskilled workers. Hence, depending on the models and
assumptions chosen, outsourcing of the low-skill intensive part of production can
lead to decreases or increases in the wage of (unskilled) labour in the outsourcing
economy.4 Whether workers in practice gain or lose from fragmentation and
relocation is, therefore, largely an empirical question.
These theoretical models assume that wages are flexible and that there is no
unemployment. Furthermore, the two sector models assume that labour is mobile
between industries. Clearly, these assumptions are generally violated in the real
world, at least in the short run. This is where the role of labour market institutions
comes into play. Many countries have, in some form or other, collective wage
bargaining or coordination of wage bargaining, as well as some form of
employment protection and unemployment benefits. This, on the one hand, leads
to rigidities in the labour market but is also designed to safeguard workers against
adverse shocks in the economy. However, to our knowledge there is a gap in the
theoretical literature about what role labour market institutions play in shaping the
effects of outsourcing on wages, so to provide some knowledge about the
relationship we will as a first step assess empirically how outsourcing affects wages
in the three countries under consideration. Nevertheless, based on a description of
how labour market institutions work in United Kingdom, Germany and Denmark we
will try to outline some plausible relationships and predictions.
Of the three countries considered, Germany has arguably the least flexible labour
market institutions. In terms of employment protection, Germany has an elaborate
system of legal rules and contracts that stipulate conditions for dismissal, providing
fairly secure employment prospects for workers, but making hiring and firing of
workers difficult for firms. In fact, as Nickell et al. (2005) show, Germany has one
of the highest levels of employment protection among OECD countries. Further-
more, the German labour market is characterised by the importance of unions in
4 See also Jones and Kierzkowski (2001) and Kohler (2004) for other related theoretical papers.
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wage bargaining. While the actual level of unionisation is only about 30 percent of
employees, the percentage of employees who are covered by wage bargaining is
around 90 percent (Nickell et al. 2005). Collective bargaining generally takes place
annually between unions and employer federations and can be at either industry and/
or regional level.5 It is important to note, however, that in collective bargaining only
minimum wages are determined, while many workers are paid wages above that
floor rate.
Compared to Germany, the UK represents the other, more flexible, end of the
spectrum in terms of European labour market institutions. The level of employment
protection is one of the lowest among OECD countries (with only the US and
Canada being more flexible) and it also has substantially lower levels of union
density and coverage than most other continental European countries (Nickell et al.
2005). Indeed, wage setting is generally decentralised and is relatively free of
regulations, as discussed in some detail by Borland et al. (2002). The UK has
adopted a system of a national minimum wage in 1999.
Turning to Denmark, an important characteristic of the labour market is that it is
heavily unionised and although a process of decentralisation of wage formation has
been ongoing since the late 1980’s the wage structure is still relatively compressed
even by European standards. Compared to other continental European labour
markets the Danish labour market is often described as being very flexible as
employment protection is relatively weak, while at the same time replacement
rates of unemployment insurance (UI) benefits are high. A third distinguishing
characteristic of the Danish labour market is that large sums are spent on active
labour market policies. Together these ingredients form what by some has been
dubbed the ‘flexicurity’ model. The idea behind this model is that Danish firms
relatively easily may adjust employment according to demand. As compensation for
high job turnover workers receive relatively generous UI benefits when unem-
ployed, but incentives to search for jobs during unemployment are reinforced by a
strict ‘activation’ regulation.
This labour market model has led to turnover rates and an average tenure which
are in line with those of the Anglo-Saxon countries. In 1995 the average tenure in
the Danish labour market was the lowest in continental Europe with 7.9 years
just exceeding the number for the UK (7.8 years) while average tenure in the
German labour market was 9.7 years (OECD 1997). Motivated by the fact that
unemployment in Denmark is very low, OECD (2005) has recently recommended
Germany to learn from the Danish ‘flexicurity’ model in its attempt to combat
unemployment.
Table 1 summarises some important characteristics for the labour markets in
(West) Germany, the UK and Denmark, which are taken from Nickell et al. (2005).
The wage setting processes are clearly important to our analysis, and they are
evidently following different mechanisms in the three countries. Wage formation in
the UK is very flexible as union density, collective bargaining coverage and union
co-ordination are lowest in the UK. In contrast, unions play a much more important
role in the German and Danish labour markets—union density is highest in
5 See also Bender et al. (2002) for a good description of labour market institutions in Germany.
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Denmark while the coverage rate is highest in Germany, and wage bargaining in
both countries is highly coordinated. Thus based on these observations we should
expect that wages are most sensitive to changes in international outsourcing at the
industry level in the UK.
However, this is not the complete picture since adjustments may go through
employment changes instead. Coupled with the average tenures cited above it is
clear that employment protection stands out as the most restrictive in Germany.
Therefore the German labour market may be seen as the least flexible as wages are
relatively rigid and employment is protected. The UK in contrast is the most flexible
of the three economies with very little regulation of employment and wages, while
Denmark is in between with rigid wage formation and low employment protection.
A possible expectation concerning the differential impact of outsourcing in the
three countries is that wages should be least affected in Denmark, since with rigid
wages adjustments are likely to go through employment changes instead.
International outsourcing may give rise to wage moderation in bargaining between
firms and unions if, for example, it corresponds to improved outside options for
employers. This may be especially true for labour markets such as the German
where employment is highly protected and thus cannot easily adjust. Thus even if
wages are relatively rigid in Germany they may still adjust if faced with increasing
outsourcing pressure. Furthermore, it is important to recall that centralised
bargaining only determines the minimum level of wage, while most workers are
paid above that level. Hence, wages may adjust by moving towards the minimum. In
the UK both wages and employment may adjust so it is not entirely clear which
dimension any adjustment may follow. Thus one may expect wages to be relatively
insensitive to international outsourcing in Denmark, while they are more likely to
adjust in Germany and the UK. In the following sections we address this question
empirically in order to get a first impression of what the data tell us.
3 Methodology
To assess the impact of outsourcing on individual wages we follow the approach in
Geishecker and Go¨rg (2008) and Munch and Skaksen (2009) and estimate simple
Mincer human capital wage equations of the form
Table 1 Labour market characteristics, 1994–1999
Germany (W) UK Denmark
Union density (%, 1996–1998) 27 35 76
Collective bargaining coverage (%, 1994) 92 40 69
Co-ordination index (1995–1999) 2.5 1.0 2.0
Employment protection index (1998) 1.30 0.35 0.70
UI replacement ratio (1999) 0.37 0.17 0.66
Expenditure on ALMP (% of GDP, 1998) 1.26 0.34 1.66
Source: Nickell et al. (2005)
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log wijt ¼ aþ bXit þ cYjt þ kOUTjt1 þ lt þ ai þ ij þ ijt; ð1Þ
where wijt is the hourly wage of worker i in industry j at time t. Xit is a vector of
standard demographic and human capital variables which includes age, age squared,
dummies for the presence of children and being married, job tenure, tenure squared,
an indicator variable for high education, dummies for occupation using the nine
main categories of the ISCO code, dummies for firm size and regional dummies.
Year effects, lt, and individual specific fixed effects, ai, are also controlled for. In
addition we include industry dummies ij; and to control for time varying industry
characteristics and industry-specific technological progress we also enter industry
output, Yjt, and industry research and development intensity, R&D/Y, in the model.
The main explanatory variable of interest, of course, is the outsourcing variable,
OUTjt-1, which we describe in more detail below. Industry level variables such as
outsourcing are likely exogenous to the individual worker, but if there are industry
components in individual wages (e.g. through collective bargaining) there may still
be some endogeneity. We use the lagged value of outsourcing as a simple approach
to alleviate any such problems.
All the regressions are weighted using the standard sampling weights from the
respective data sets to adjust for different individual sampling probabilities. Finally
a methodological point should be mentioned. In the wage Eq. 1 we estimate the
effect of an aggregate variable (i.e. outsourcing at the industry level) on wages of
individual workers, so the standard errors of the estimated coefficients may be
biased downwards as indicated in Moulton (1990). Accordingly, we adjust standard
errors allowing for contemporaneous correlation as has become standard in the
literature.
3.1 Measurement of international outsourcing
Anecdotal evidence on firms shifting production stages abroad by subcontracting
legally independent suppliers or establishing foreign production sites is manifold.
However, systematically measuring the process of international outsourcing
presents a challenge. Ideally one would want firm-level measures of outsourcing,
but such information is rarely available and this is also the case for the three
countries under consideration here. Instead we follow most of the literature and
construct outsourcing measures at the industry level.
Most authors rely on trade statistics, exploiting the close relation between
international outsourcing and trade in intermediate goods. Authors such as Yeats
(2001) seek to measure international outsourcing or, as he calls it, production
sharing, by directly quantifying trade in intermediate goods, assessing the
intermediate character of the traded goods on the basis of disaggregated goods
classifications. However, such calculations most likely are upward-biased, as
imported parts and components (of machinery and transport equipment) are
assumed to be intermediate goods imports of the respective broader industry that
produces such parts and components itself (machinery and transport equipment
industry). This abstracts from the possibility that parts and components from one
industry can be also used by other manufacturing and service industries or by final
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consumers. Having said that, at the country level, differentiating trade in
intermediate goods arguably is a valid way to derive a broad picture of the overall
outsourcing intensity. However, in order to generate industry-level outsourcing
measures, one needs to find ways to appropriately allocate imports of parts and
components to those industries that actually use them.
Authors such as Feenstra and Hanson (1999) or Campa and Goldberg (1997)
quantify international outsourcing by combining input coefficients that can be found
in input-output tables and trade data. The estimated value of imported intermediate
inputs of an industry thereby largely depends on whether one applies a narrow or
wide definition of international outsourcing.
Campa and Goldberg (1997) assume that the total sum of imported intermediate
goods in each industry as a share of the respective industry’s production value
represents a reasonable indicator for international outsourcing. However, according
to Feenstra and Hanson (1999) the above definition might be too broad if one
understands international outsourcing to be the result of a make-or-buy decision.
Following this approach, it is not the total sum of imported intermediate inputs but
only the part that could be produced within the respective domestic industry that
actually constitutes international outsourcing. However, depending on the aggregational
level, the range of products that an industry can produce varies. Accordingly, the more
highly aggregated the industries are, the broader the definition of international
outsourcing becomes.
For the present analysis we loosely follow the concept proposed in Feenstra and
Hanson (1999) and measure narrow international outsourcing as the shift of a two-
digit industry’s core activities abroad, represented by the value of the industry’s
imported intermediate inputs from the same industry abroad as a share of the
domestic industry’s production value. The challenge is now to measure the
respective industry’s imports of intermediate goods. A simple procedure would
be to assume that all imports from a certain foreign industry i* are directed towards
the respective domestic industry i and nowhere else. Essentially, this would amount
to the construction of industry-level import penetration ratios, which are however
rather poor measures of industries’ outsourcing activities. Instead, input-output data
that are available from national Statistic Offices are utilised in order to allocate
imports according to their usage as input factors across industries. The use of input-
output tables renders obsolete the differentiation of intermediate goods on the basis
of disaggregated goods classifications. Imports are always counted as intermediate
goods imports if they are used in manufacturing.
Formally, outsourcing is constructed as:
OUTSit ¼ IMPi
t  Xiit
Yit
ð2Þ
with IMPit denoting imported intermediate inputs from industry i
* and Yit the
production value of industry i at time t. Xiit denotes the share of imports from a
foreign industry i* that is consumed by the respective domestic industry i in t withPI
i¼1 Xiit  IMPit ¼ total imports from industry i* which are not only used in
manufacturing but also in agriculture, services, private and public consumption,
investment and exports in t.
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Accordingly, we construct industry-level outsourcing measures for each country.
In doing so we are, however, constrained by different availability of input-output
tables for the different countries. While for Denmark use tables for imported inputs
are available from 1990 to 2002, for Germany comparable tables are only available
for 1991 until 2000.6
For the UK data availability is even more limited as input–output data
differentiating between imports and domestic production is only available for 1995.7
Accordingly we use available yearly input-output tables from UK National Statistics
which, however, do not differentiate between imports and domestic supplies.
Table 2 summarises these constraints. In order to estimate our empirical model for a
common period with as many years as possible we select the years 1991 until 2000
as joint sample period and for the UK use 1992 values of X for the missing year
1991.
Table 3 presents international outsourcing as weighted averages over all
manufacturing industries in the UK, Denmark and Germany as well as correspond-
ing growth rates. Generally speaking, the level of international outsourcing is
roughly comparable across the three countries ranging from six to seven percent in
1999. In terms of total growth of international outsourcing, which is of course more
meaningful than the sheer level, the UK stands out. Here outsourcing grew by about
49% over the years 1991 to 1999. In comparison growth rates in Germany and
Denmark are somewhat lower, but with 30% and 25% still substantial.
By differentiating imports by their origin while assuming Xiit to be constant
across import origins we can in a next step construct outsourcing measures for
different geographic regions. Against the backdrop of dramatic political and
economic change we are particularly interested in outsourcing towards Central and
Eastern European Countries (CEEC) but also towards low-wage countries in Asia.
Equation 2 can then be separated geographically:
OUTSit ¼
PC
c¼1 IMPict  Xiit
Yit
ð3Þ
Table 2 Availability of input–output data
Country Separate I–O tables for imports
United Kingdom Not available Instead aggregated
yearly tables 1992–2004
Denmark Available 1990–2002
Germany Available 1991–2000
6 In 2007 the German Federal Statistical Office released a major update of input–output tables, however
only for the years from 1995 onwards. The present analysis is restricted to the 1990s. We therefore only
utilize the initial release for the years 1991–2000.
7 Input-output data for the UK in this respect are similar to that for the US which also do differentiate
between imports and domestic production.
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with IMPict denoting imported inputs from industry i
* in the country of origin c and
Yit the production value of industry i at time t.
To account for potentially heterogenous effects we differentiate between
outsourcing towards four economic regions: CEEC, low-wage Asia (LwAsia),
high-wage OECD (HwOECD) and all other countries in the rest of the World
Table 3 Outsourcing intensity (per cent)
Year World CEEC LwAsia HwOECD RoW
Germany
1991 5.25 0.10 0.31 4.45 0.39
1992 5.40 0.13 0.31 4.59 0.37
1993 5.13 0.23 0.36 4.26 0.28
1994 5.35 0.28 0.40 4.35 0.32
1995 5.93 0.38 0.44 4.74 0.37
1996 5.71 0.38 0.44 4.56 0.33
1997 6.31 0.47 0.47 5.00 0.37
1998 6.69 0.56 0.47 5.26 0.40
1999 6.84 0.63 0.51 4.90 0.80
Growth rate 30.33 546.21 64.26 10.11 104.54
United Kingdom
1991 4.10 0.02 0.22 3.49 0.38
1992 4.45 0.02 0.25 3.71 0.47
1993 4.71 0.04 0.33 3.69 0.64
1994 5.08 0.06 0.36 4.15 0.51
1995 5.23 0.07 0.39 4.27 0.50
1996 5.49 0.07 0.47 4.30 0.65
1997 5.79 0.08 0.56 4.82 0.32
1998 6.31 0.09 0.66 5.19 0.37
1999 6.11 0.09 0.63 4.67 0.72
Growth rate 48.92 430.85 193.91 33.76 89.94
Denmark
1991 4.94 0.09 0.26 3.22 1.37
1992 4.90 0.10 0.25 3.14 1.42
1993 4.43 0.08 0.20 2.91 1.23
1994 4.97 0.11 0.20 3.23 1.44
1995 5.67 0.12 0.18 3.98 1.39
1996 6.27 0.12 0.20 4.40 1.54
1997 6.57 0.12 0.20 4.82 1.43
1998 6.50 0.11 0.21 4.76 1.41
1999 6.18 0.13 0.17 4.41 1.47
Growth rate 25.07 34.68 -33.55 37.11 7.36
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(RoW).8 The respective figures are reported in Table 3. As becomes apparent, the
intensity of outsourcing towards CEEC significantly differs between the three
countries with Germany’s outsourcing intensity towards CEEC in 1999 being more
than four times higher than that of Denmark and the UK. Also in terms of growth
rates, Germany is leading with a total growth rate of 546%, swiftly followed by the
UK with total growth of 431%. Clearly, such figures are impressive; one has,
however, to bear in mind, that outsourcing almost started from zero in 1991.
With respect to outsourcing towards low-wage countries in Asia, the UK shows
the highest intensity closely followed by Germany and in some distance Denmark.
Also in terms of growth of outsourcing towards low-wage Asia the UK is with a
total growth rate of 194% most dynamic, followed by Germany while Danish firms
substantially reduced their respective outsourcing intensity.
3.2 Individual-level data
We measure wages and worker characteristics using individual-level data for the
three countries. The nature of data sets we use differs to some extent as data for the
UK and Germany are based on surveys while data for Denmark come from
administrative registers. However, in all cases we look at individual panel data for
the period 1991–2000, and we restrict the samples to include only 18–65 year old
male manufacturing workers. Special attention has been paid to construction of
the explanatory variables in a consistent way across countries. For example, the
education variable ‘High education’ is defined as the two highest categories in the
International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED), which corresponds to
the individual having tertiary education.
For Germany, the analysis is based on individual-level data from the German
Socio Economic Panel (GSOEP). Specifically, the analysis is based on data from
Sample A, B, C, D and E.9 We exclude respondents who report to work in East
Germany as wages in the East are to a large extent shaped by the dramatic structural
change of the economy that has been taking place since the fall of the wall and that
dominates the impact of other changing structural factors such as outsourcing.
Wages are defined as average hourly gross labour earnings including bonuses,
premia and other extra payments over the year preceding the respective interview
month.
For the UK, data come from the Britsh Household Panel Survey (BHPS), a
household survey that follows the same representative sample of individuals over
time. Again, as for Germany wages are defined as average hourly gross labour
8 CEEC are: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovak
Republic, Slovenia. LwAsia comprises: Bangladesh, Cambodia, China, India, Indonesia, Korea, Laos,
Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand, Vietnam but also Hong Kong and Singapur as they are
important trade intermediaries. HwOECD countries are all OECD countries except CEEC, Korea, Mexico
and Turkey.
9 See Haisken-DeNew and Frick (2003) for a detailed description of the panel. The GSOEP data used in
this paper were extracted using the Add-On package PanelWhiz for Stata. PanelWhiz (http://www.
PanelWhiz.eu) was written by Dr. John P. Haisken-DeNew (john@PanelWhiz.eu). See Haisken-DeNew
and Hahn (2006) for details. The PanelWhiz generated DO file to retrieve the data used here is available
on request. Any data or computational errors in this paper are our own.
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earnings including bonuses, premia and other extra payments over the year
preceding the respective interview month.
For Denmark, the analysis relies on a large data set which is extracted from the
Integrated Database for Labour Market Research (IDA) and the Income Registers in
Statistics Denmark. There is information about individual characteristics for a 10%
sample of workers in Danish manufacturing industries, and since the data is based
on administrative registers its reliability is highly regarded. The hourly wage rate is
calculated as total labour income divided by the total number of hours worked in
any given year.
Figure 1 charts the development of median wages for high- and low-skilled
workers, as well as the relative wage of unskilled workers to skilled workers, for the
three countries over the period of analysis. The wages are expressed as indices with
the levels in 1992 corresponding to 100. What is notable is that for the UK and
Denmark we see increases in the wage for skilled workers outstripping that for low-
skilled workers. For Germany there is no such clear picture. Of course, these
aggregate tables hide a lot of variation at the micro level. In order to examine the
link between outsourcing and individual wages we, therefore, turn to econometric
estimations of variants of Eq. 1 for the three countries under consideration.
4 Estimation results
In this section we present the results from estimating Eq. 1 for all three countries.
Columns (1), (3) and (5) in Table 4 report the baseline results for Germany, the UK
and Denmark, respectively. Focussing on the coefficient on international outsourc-
ing we find that there is a small negative and weakly statistically significant effect
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on wages for Germany. An one percentage point increase in German outsourcing
intensity lowers average German manufacturing wages by about 1.6 percent. Thus,
the overall demand effect of outsourcing is very small, which also becomes apparent
when looking at the cumulative wage effect of outsourcing between 1991 and 1999.
From Table 3 we know that over the sample period average outsourcing increased
by 1.6 percentage. Hence outsourcing cumulatively reduced wages by about 2.5
percent.
For the UK aggregated outsourcing appears to have the opposite effect. An one
percentage point increase in outsourcing ceteris paribus raises UK wages by on
average 1.3 percent. Over the sample period outsourcing in the UK increase by 2
percentage points. Accordingly, the cumulative effect of UK outsourcing over the
sample period is a 2.7 percent increase in average wages. For Denmark we fail to
find any statistically significant coefficient.
While this regression controls for the skill level of the worker, it does not allow
the effect of outsourcing to differ according to skills. However, from theory we may
expect different effects: if countries outsource mainly low-skill production activities
then in partial equilibrium the demand for low-skilled workers falls, bringing with it
a reduction in the wage for these types of workers.
In order to allow for differential effects we interact the outsourcing variable with
dummy variables for high- and low-skilled workers, respectively. These results are
reported in Columns (2), (4) and (6) in Table 4.
We find that the negative effect found in the previous estimation for Germany
only accrues to low-skilled workers. There is no statistically significant effect of
outsourcing on high-skilled workers in Germany. Hence, this suggests that in
Germany wages for low-skilled workers adjust downward in response to increased
international outsourcing. Accordingly, in Germany on average an one percentage
point increase in the outsourcing intensity lowers wages for low-skilled workers by
a little more than one percent.10
In the UK, however, our results indicate that the previously identified positive
wage effect of outsourcing is limited to high-skilled workers. Cumulatively
outsourcing leads to high-skilled wage increases of on average three percent. For
low-skilled UK workers we cannot identify an outsourcing effect with sufficient
precision.
Similarly, when differentiating between different skill groups in Denmark we
find that outsourcing raises high-skilled workers wages while the coefficient for
low-skilled workers is statistically insignificant. The positive wage effect is,
however, very small. An one percentage point increase in outsourcing raises high-
skilled wages by 0.4 percent. Cumulatively this amounts to a 0.5 percent wage
increase for high-skilled workers due to aggregate outsourcing.
In the estimations thus far we treat outsourcing across regions as one
homogeneous activity. Clearly, this is not the case. In order to allow for some
10 The result of a negative effect for low-skilled workers is in line with Geishecker and Go¨rg (2008).
However, they also find a positive effect of outsourcing for high-skilled workers. This is likely to be due
to their using more control variables and a finer skill classification, distinguishing three skill types, in the
empirical model. This was not possible in our case in order to ensure that we estimate the same model for
all three countries.
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heterogeneity in the activities that are outsourced we distinguish outsourcing to
CEEC from outsourcing to low-wage Asia (LwAsia), high-wage OECD (HwOECD)
countries and some remaining RoW category. While outsourcing to CEEC and
LwAsia is likely to include outsourcing of many low-skilled manufacturing
activities the latter group of countries contains outsourcing mainly to other
developed countries and, therefore, the type of outsourcing should be considered
different. Table 5 presents regression results where we split up the outsourcing
variable by broad region, and also allow for differential effects according to skill
levels.
Results for Germany (column 1) show that when decomposing outsourcing by
region the wage effects of outsourcing cannot be identified with sufficient
precision. For the UK (Table 5, column 3) we now, however, find a sizable
negative and statistically significant wage effect of outsourcing to CEEC. An one
percentage point increase in the average intensity of outsourcing to CEEC ceteris
paribus lowers UK manufacturing wages by about 38 percent. To put this into
perspective, according to Table 3 UK outsourcing to CEEC increased by 0.07
percentage points. Thus the cumulative effect of outsourcing to CEEC is very
modest wage reduction of 2.7 percent. In comparison, outsourcing to high-wage
OECD countries is found to yield weakly statistically significant positive wage
effects. According to Table 3 UK outsourcing to high-wage OECD countries
increased by 1.2 percentage points. Thus, UK manufacturing wages are cumula-
tively raised by modest 2.6 percent. Furthermore, outsourcing to LwAsia and RoW
also appears to raise average UK wages. However, the effects can only be estimated
with insufficient precision.
For Denmark we also find a statistically significant negative wage effect
of outsourcing to CEEC (Table 5, column 5). According to Table 3 Danish
outsourcing to CEEC increased by 0.04 percentage points. Thus, the cumulative
wage effect of of outsourcing to CEEC is only -0.2 percent and economically
negligible.
Nevertheless, simply looking at homogenous outsourcing masks important
differences in effects depending on individual skills. In a next step we therefore
interact geographically decomposed outsourcing with educational attainment to
capture potentially different effects across skill groups. The respective results are
reported in columns (2), (4) and (6) in Table 5.
For Germany, although the coefficients of outsourcing partly are sizable (see
column 2) we cannot reject their insignificance within reasonable confidence bounds
suggesting that the demand effects of outsourcing are fairly heterogenous across
individuals irrespective of the outsourcing region.
For the UK, however, we find low-skilled workers to experience statistically
significant wage cuts due to outsourcing to CEEC (see Table 5, column 4). The 0.07
percentage point increase of UK outsourcing towards CEEC lowers wages of low-
skilled workers by about 3 percent. At the same time there is some evidence that
also high-skilled workers experience wage cuts due to outsourcing to CEEC, the
effect, however, cannot be identified with sufficient precision.
Finally, for Denmark (column 6) we find a negative statistically significant effect
of outsourcing to CEEC on low-skilled workers wages and a positive statistically
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significant wage effect for high-skilled workers. Cumulatively, increased outsourc-
ing towards CEEC lowered low-skilled wages by only 0.2 percent while the
respective cumulative effect for high-skilled workers is a 0.2 percent wage increase.
Albeit statistically significant coefficients, both effects are negligible in an
economic sense. Other types of outsourcing do not appear to have any statistically
significant effect on either skilled or unskilled workers.
Recall that one possible expectation concerning the mediating impact of labour
market institutions on outsourcing was that wages should be least sensitive to
outsourcing in Denmark, since wages are set in negotiations between unions and
firms, while employment protection is low so that any adjustments are more likely
to go through job separations. By contrast we argued that wages in Germany and the
UK could be more responsive to outsourcing.
First of all, we find that low-skilled workers in all three countries are likely to
suffer negative wage effects, in the case of the UK and Denmark particularly from
outsourcing to CEEC. In line with our intuition wage effects of outsourcing in
Denmark are significantly lower (if not negligible) than those in Germany and the
UK. However, wage cuts due to outsourcing are very small even in the UK and
Germany. One interesting result is that we find a positive, small but not negligible
wage effect of outsourcing for high-skilled workers in the UK which, arguably, is in
line with the idea of more flexibel wage setting institutions in the UK. However,
overall we conclude that our results only lend weak support for simple intuition
regarding the mitigating impact of labour market institutions.
5 Conclusion
This paper studies the impact of international outsourcing on individual wages in
Germany, the UK and Denmark. To do so we use individual-level wage data for the
three countries and construct comparable measures of outsourcing at the industry
level, distinguishing outsourcing to Central and Eastern Europe from other
countries. While our discussion of labour market institutions may suggest an
intuitive predication that there should be differences in effects across countries, our
empirical analysis, based on estimating the same specification for the three
countries, shows that the effects are, actually, quite similar and fairly small. Low-
skilled workers experience reductions in real wages, in the UK particular through
outsourcing to Central and Eastern European Countries. There is also some evidence
that high-skilled workers benefit through higher wages at least in the UK. This
suggests that the relationship between labour market institutions, outsourcing and
wages is more complex than our simple intuitive discussion. More theoretical work
is needed to pin down the exact nature of the relationship, in order to get a better
understanding of the effects of outsourcing on wages under different institutional
settings.
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